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Introduction 
 
The Cold War defined two rival spheres of influence. No less important, it defined 
two sets of identities. Whether or not they shared its objectives, citizens of the 
communist-ruled countries in the east were part of a larger system of values, alliances 
and institutions. They were a ‘socialist community’ in which a distinctive way of 
life—collectivist and materialist—was supposed to be consolidating its influence. 
Their economies and political systems were interconnected; they shared the same 
external borders, and defended them in a co-ordinated way. If they went on holiday, it 
was to the Black Sea rather than the Mediterranean; if they drank wine, it would 
probably be Bulgarian; if they read a book in their own language or translation, it was 
more likely that the author was Gorky or Sholokhov than George Orwell or 
Solzhenitsyn (and certainly not the Bible). Nor were these impressions misleading. 
More than half of the USSR’s foreign trade in the early 1980s, for instance, was with 
other communist ruled countries (54%, compared with 32% with the capitalist world), 
and foreign trade as a whole accounted less than 10%of the entire economy.1 
With the dismantling of the Berlin Wall, all these distinctions began to lose their 
earlier significance. Countries divided—the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia—
or reunited (the two Germanys), and very different patterns of association began to 
establish themselves. Some of the newly independent states joined the European 
Union (EU) and NATO; others joined the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS), established at the end of 1991 as the USSR itself dissolved. Six of the former 
Soviet republics set up a Collective Security Organization; five of them established a 
Eurasian Economic Community, and four of them—Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and 
Ukraine—a ‘Single Economic Space’. Belarus and Russia established the closest 
relationship of all with a ‘Community’ and then, in 1997, a more far-reaching 
‘Union’, but elsewhere there were patterns of association that excluded Russia 
altogether, notably GUAM, which brought together Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and 
Moldova (and for a time Uzbekistan). Foreign trade reflected this greater diversity: by 
2005, only 15% of Russia’s foreign trade turnover was with the former Soviet 
republics that were members of the CIS, and more than half was with the EU. Belarus 
and Ukraine did rather more of their trade with CIS member countries, but here too 
the figures were in decline.2 
Perhaps the most fundamental of these reorientations was in relation to ‘Europe’. 
Geography hardly resolved the matter: the boundaries of ‘Europe’ had been drawn in 
different places at different times,3 and there were countries that straddled the 
geographical divide, most obviously Russia. Perhaps it was a matter of ‘civilizations’? 
But although Huntington had emphasized the Christian/Islamic dichotomy more than 
any other, he also differentiated between the countries in the ‘West’ (which were 
marked out by individualism, the separation of church and state, the rule of law and a 
market economy) and a ‘Slavic-Orthodox’ civilization in the east, also Christian, but 
one in which church and state were related more closely and foreign domination had 
lasted much longer. Differences of this kind, Huntington suggested, were the ‘product 
of centuries’, and ‘far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies 
and political regimes’. Belarus and Ukraine were on both sides of this dividing line; 
Russia was also a ‘torn country’, wholly Orthodox but spread across two continents, 
and whether it was really ‘European’ or ‘Asiatic’ had been debated since at least the 
time of Pushkin’s exchanges with Chadaev.4 
In this article we seek to advance the discussion of these large and complex issues by 
focusing on self-perceptions in the three Slavic countries that have come to form the 
European Union’s new ‘neighbourhood’: countries that share the same borders but 
which are located outside the framework of EU institutions, and which have their own 
patterns of association. We look first of all at European and other self-perceptions; we 
then examine the characteristics with which they are associated, including their 
distribution within countries as well as between them. In the final section we relate 
European self-perceptions to wider patterns, including political and economic values 
and party choice, in order to establish the extent to which a European orientation 
‘makes a difference’. We draw our evidence from national representative surveys 
conducted in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine between 2000 and 2005, which are 
themselves part of a wider inquiry that includes focus groups and elite interviews as 
well as the analysis of printed sources. Fuller details of the surveys are provided in the 
Appendix.5 
 
 
‘Feeling European’ 
We asked, first of all, if our respondents in the three countries thought of themselves 
as ‘Europeans’, and to what extent. Our results are set out in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. European self-identity, 2000–2005 (percentage of respondents) 
 
Belarus Russia Ukraine  
2000 2004 2000 2004 2005 2000 2004 
To a significant extent  16 9 18 9 7 8 6 
To some extent 34 25 34 21 18 26 20 
Seldom 38 17 28 13 14 57 13 
Not at all  37 19 47 54  49 
N 2000 1599 1940 2000 2000 1590 2000 
 
Source: authors’ surveys (see Appendix). 
Notes: Question wording was ‘Do you think of yourself as a European?’. In 2000 the Belarusian and 
Ukrainian responses were ‘often’, ‘sometimes’ and ‘never’. Figures show rounded percentages. 
Estimates exclude ‘Don’t knows’ and ‘No answers’, and therefore do not sum to 100%. 
 
Several conclusions emerge. First of all, in every case European self-identity has been 
declining: most of all in Russia, but the same trends are apparent in the other two 
countries. About half of our Russian and Belarusian respondents in 2000 thought they 
were, at least to some extent, ‘European’, and more than a third of our Ukrainians 
thought the same. Five years later the proportions were down to a third (Belarus) or a 
quarter (Russia and Ukraine). Moreover, the largest shift of opinion—at least in 
Russia—had been towards those who felt they were ‘not at all’ European, who 
represented about half of all our Russian respondents in 2004–5. In every case, 
including Belarus, this was the most common response in 2004–5; by contrast, in 
2000, in Russia, the largest single group of respondents had felt at least ‘to some 
extent’ European.  
Identities are always multiple and polyvalent, and no single question is likely to yield 
a complete and unambiguous set of responses. Accordingly, in 2004–5 we asked a 
related set of questions using a wording modelled on the Eurobarometer, which 
allowed for a plurality of responses and provided results that could in principle be 
compared across the entire continent. Our results are set out in Table 2. Again, the 
main conclusions are clear. Overwhelmingly, in each country our respondents felt 
their first identity was as a citizen of that country. Almost to the same extent, our 
respondents felt they were citizens of their local area or settlement; regional identities 
were also popular; but relatively few thought of their identity as a European one, in 
the first or even second place. Belarusians, who had been somewhat more likely to 
think of themselves as ‘Europeans’, were also the most likely to identify themselves 
with a European identity. However, the numbers in every case were relatively low 
and, if anything, declining: in Russia and Ukraine, those who identified themselves as 
‘European’ were fewer 
than those who still saw themselves as Soviet citizens a decade or more after the 
demise of the USSR. 
Across the countries of the European Union, levels of identification with ‘Europe’ are 
considerably higher. The Eurobarometer asks routinely if respondents think of 
themselves as nationals of their own country, as Europeans, or as nationals of their 
own country and also Europeans. According to the exercise  
 
Table 2. European vs. other self-identities, 2004–5 
 
Belarus Russia Ukraine 
2004 2004 2005 2004 
European  16 10 8 10 
Eurasian 2 6 3 2 
Soviet citizen 10 13 13 11 
Citizen of my country 72 76 76 69 
Citizen of my region 18 29 29 27 
From my settlement 65 69 69 69 
N 1599 2000 2000 2000 
 
Source: as Table 1. 
Notes: Question wording was ‘Which of the following do you think of yourself to be first of all? And 
secondly?’ Figures show all who gave a corresponding response as their first or second choice, in 
rounded percentages. ‘Don’t know’ and ‘No answers’ account for residuals. Totals exceed 100% as a 
result of the aggregation of first and second choices. 
 
that was fielded during the period of our surveys, 57% thought they had at least a 
partly European identity and 41% had only a national identity; a European identity of 
this kind ranged from 68% in France to 43% in the United Kingdom, and among 2004 
EU entrants from 69% in Cyprus to 36% in Hungary. Although not precisely 
comparable, our own figures suggested a primary or secondary European identity in 
Belarus, Russia and Ukraine that was nowhere more than 16%, and a primary or 
secondary national identity that was nowhere less than 69%. These figures were not 
simply lower than those for all current and prospective EU member countries; they 
were also below those for Turkey, a largely Asian country with little immediate 
prospect of accession.6  
Were these identities distributed randomly, or associated with particular sets of 
characteristics? We set out the evidence in Table 3, relating a variety of 
socioeconomic circumstances to the three most distinctive and widely supported 
choices: ‘European’, ‘Soviet’ or ‘own country’. Those who thought of themselves as 
‘Europeans’ in the first instance were somewhat more likely to be younger people; 
they tended to be male; and in Russia and Ukraine, they were likely to have higher 
levels of education. In Ukraine alone, they were likely to have higher (self-assessed) 
incomes. ‘Soviet citizens’, by contrast, were likely to be older, reflecting the years 
they had lived in what was still the USSR, with lower levels of education: more or 
less the inverse of ‘Europeans’. Those who indicated that they were ‘citizens of their 
own country’ in the first instance were broadly representative of the entire sample in 
terms of age. In Belarus they were more likely to be urban, and in Belarus and Russia 
they were less likely to have a lower level of education; in all three cases there was an 
association with higher levels of income. Overall, however, the differences across the 
three countries were relatively insignificant and not always symmetrical. 
 
Table 3. European vs. other self-identities by socio-economic characteristics (SEC) 
 
Belarus Russia Ukraine  
SEC EUR SOV OC EUR SOV OC EUR SOV  OC 
Male 8 6 46 4 6 49 5 8 43 
Female 6 6 41 3 9 43 3 7 37 
Under 30 years 9 2 46 5 3 49 5 2 43 
60 or older 4 11 39 3 12 45 2 12 37 
City 7 6 47 4 7 47 4 8 40 
Rural 6 7 34 3 9 44 3 6 38 
Primary education 6 10 32 1 13 39 1 9 36 
Higher education 6 4 51 4 9 44 8 6 42 
Low income 8 5 39 3 9 38 2 9 35 
High income 8 5 52 4 6 52 10 4 48 
Total 7 6 43 4 8 46 4 7 39 
 
Source: as Table 1. 
Notes: Question wording as Table 1, showing those who gave a corresponding response as their first 
choice, in rounded percentages, within each SEC for each country. ‘EUR’, ‘SOV’ and ‘OC’ denote, 
respectively, a ‘European’, ‘Soviet citizen’ or ‘citizen of my country’ option; ‘others’ (not shown) 
account for residuals. Cells highlighted in bold show a statistically significant association between the 
two variables, judged by the values of adjusted residuals (see R. Miller et al., SPSS for Social 
Scientists, Basingstoke/New York, 2002). 
 
The regional dimension 
Just as we would not expect ‘feeling European’ to be distributed randomly by socio-
economic characteristics, we would not expect it to be distributed evenly across space. 
Russia sprawls across two continents, with most of its territory in Asia, although 
about three-quarters of its population lives in geographical Europe. To the west, it 
borders some of the European Union member countries; after the enlargement of 
2004, taking in the three Baltic republics, its border with the EU roughly doubled in 
length. Regional differences are more pronounced in the other two countries, which 
lie on both sides of Huntington’s fault line: it separates an historical experience that 
has been more heavily influenced, in the east, by Orthodoxy, the Russian language 
and authoritarianism, and in the west by Catholicism, the Ukrainian language and 
more limited forms of government. Crimea, in the south, was a part of Russia until it 
was transferred arbitrarily to Ukrainian jurisdiction in 1954, and it remains 
overwhelmingly Russian by language and nationality. A series of investigations has 
established that these differences are ‘contextual’ rather than ‘compositional’: that is, 
that they remain when other factors—such as social structure—have been taken into 
account.7 
 We relate these various differences to European and other self-perceptions in Table 4, 
separating Belarusian responses into an ‘east’, a ‘centre’ and a ‘west’, Russian 
responses into ‘Europe’ and ‘Asia’, and Ukrainian responses into ‘Crimea’, ‘east’, 
‘centre’ and ‘west’.8 Regional differences, as these figures indicate, were very 
pronounced in Belarus and Ukraine: generally, the more westerly the region the more 
‘European’ the responses, although the Ukrainian ‘south’ (Crimea) was the least 
‘European’ of all, and this was also the area in which a regional self-identity was the 
most developed.9 In eastern Belarus and Ukraine, ‘Soviet citizens’ were more 
numerous than ‘Europeans’; in the west it was the 
other way round. Belarusians, overall, were more ‘European’ than Ukrainians. But the 
largest group in every case was likely to define themselves as ‘citizens of their own 
country’ or, in a few cases, of ‘their own settlement’. 
We set out these spatial differences in graphic form in Figures 1 and 2, grouping 
together those who felt ‘to a significant’ or at least ‘to some extent European’. 
 
Table 4. European and other self-identities by region 
 
Belarus 2004 Russia 2005 Ukraine 2004  
East Centre West Asia Europe Crimea East  Centre West
European 2 7 13 3 4 2 3 3 7 
Eurasian 1 1 0 3 1 0 1 1 1 
Soviet citizen 8 4 5 8 7 12 13 4 1 
Citizen of my 
country 
36 50 45 42 48 25 36 42 44 
Citizen of my 
region 
4 4 3 10 7 15 11 6 8 
From my 
settlement 
44 31 32 34 33 38 34 42 34 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Source: as Table 1. 
Notes: Question wording was ‘Which of the following do you think of yourself to be first of all?’. 
Figures show all those who gave a corresponding response as their first choice, in rounded percentages; 
‘others’ account for residuals. Statistically significant associations are highlighted on the basis of 
adjusted residuals as in Table 3. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. ‘Feeling European’ by region: Belarus and Ukraine. 
Source: authors’ surveys (see Appendix). 
Notes: Question wording was ‘Do you think of yourself as a European?’. Figures show rounded 
percentages of those who answered either ‘feel a European to a significant extent’ or ‘to some extent’. 
The samples were designed using the proportional representation method where each administrative 
unit in each country was represented in the sample proportionally to its population size. 
 
They show the same propensity for a ‘European’ self-identity to increase from east to 
west as we found with our question that allowed a choice of identities, with the lowest 
levels once again in the Crimea, and with Belarusian levels generally above those in 
the other two countries. Oddly, perhaps, there were lower levels of selfperceived 
‘Europeanness’ in central than in eastern Ukraine; there had been little difference in 
our question that allowed a choice of identities. 
There were more modest differences in Russia when we asked respondents to choose 
among a number of options: almost as many of our respondents who lived in Asia 
thought they were ‘Europeans’ as those who lived in geographical Europe. The same 
results emerged when we asked the question ‘to what extent’ our respondents felt 
European: in 2005, 7% of the entire sample ‘felt European to a significant extent’, and 
no more than 8% among those who lived in European Russia. This accords with other 
investigations, which have found ‘no significant value differences at all’ between 
respondents living to the east and to the west of the Urals; indeed, those who lived in 
Asiatic Russia were if anything more liberal—or in tune with modern European 
culture—than those who lived in European 
Russia.10 
At lower levels of aggregation, however, the same patterns obtained as in the other 
two countries (see Figure 2). Once again there was a gradient from east to west, 
although not an entirely consistent one: residents of the Far East, for instance, were 
twice as likely to think of themselves as ‘Europeans’ as those who lived in the 
Siberian federal district. Siberians, in fact, were the least likely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. ‘Feeling European’ by region: Russia. 
Source/Notes: as per Figure 1. 
 
to think of themselves as ‘Europeans’; at the other extreme, those who lived in the 
central and north-western federal districts were more than three times as likely to do 
so. Residents of the Southern, Volga and Ural federal districts were in an intermediate 
position in terms of their propensity to see themselves as ‘European’, which is 
consistent with their position along the east–west gradient; residents of the southern 
federal district were also the most likely to be undecided.  
Location is obviously associated with other differences, such as income and 
education. Does it still make a difference when factors of this kind have been taken 
into account? We set out the evidence in Figure 3, which shows the effect of ‘region’ 
when the socio-economic characteristics identified in Table 3 are held constant (for 
coding, see the note to Figure 3). The derived unstandardized coefficients 
of ‘region’ were equal to 0.273 in Belarus, 0.157 in Russia and 0.195 in Ukraine, 
showing the respective increase in ‘feeling European’ that would result from a unit 
increase in the regional factor. Estimated coefficients were then multiplied by the 
value of each region as defined in the note to Figure 3. This meant, for instance, that if 
a respondent lived in the western part of Belarus (scored as 3), it overall increased the 
level of European self-identification by approximately 0.8 (or, if compared with a 
respondent in the eastern part of Belarus, by approximately 0.5 (0.273_3 – 0.273_1)), 
holding all other variables constant. 
 
Does ‘Feeling European’ make a difference? 
As we have seen, ‘feeling European’ is distributed differentially across social groups 
and space; but differences of this kind are of no political significance unless ‘feeling 
European’ is associated with a distinctive distribution of views about the organization 
of public affairs, and particular forms of party politics. We consider some of this 
evidence in Table 5, relating a European self-perception to attitudes towards a market 
economy and towards a western-style political system in the first instance. Broadly, 
the relationship was as we had predicted: in every case, those who thought they were 
Europeans were more likely to 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The effects of region on European self-identity (change in identity). 
Source: as Table 1, 2004 surveys. 
Notes: ‘European self-identity’ is coded from 1 ¼ ‘don’t think of myself as a European at all’ to 5 ¼ 
‘think of myself as a European to a significant extent’. ‘Region’ is scored from 1 ¼ ‘East’ to 3 ¼ 
‘West’ in the case of Belarus, from 1 ¼ ‘East’, 2 ¼ ‘Centre’ to 3 ¼ ‘West’ in the case of Ukraine 
(where ‘Centre’ also incorporates Crimea—see W. Miller, S. White and P. Heywood, Values and 
Political Change in Postcommunist Europe, London, 1998, p. 71 for the aggregation of regions), 
and from 1 ¼ Far Eastern, 2 ¼ Siberian, 3 ¼ Ural, 4 ¼ Volga, 5 ¼ Southern, 6 ¼ Central to 7 ¼ 
Northwestern in the case of Russian federal districts. The regions in each case are coded on the basis of 
their remoteness/closeness to the western border. The scale of the primary (left) axis reflects changes in 
the value of European self-identity in Belarus and Ukraine; the secondary (right) axis shows the same 
values for Russia. 
 
support the principle of a market economy, and more likely to favour westernstyle 
democracy, but there was no more than an approximate fit. Indeed, across the three 
countries 31% of those who thought of themselves as Europeans opposed a market 
economy, and 40% supported a political system of the Soviet kind—views that were 
obviously some distance from the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ that define eligibility for 
membership of the European Union.  
But was it ‘Europeanness’ that made the difference, rather than (for instance) income 
or education? We examine the relationship more closely in Table 6, which sets out the 
relationship between ‘feeling European’ and the same economic and political 
principles, and European Union and NATO membership, while controlling for the 
social characteristics that are considered in Table 3, including region. As our results 
suggest, a European self-perception has very similar effects across the region: 
specifically, it is a significant predictor of support for a market economy, for western-
style democracy, and for EU and NATO membership, when personal characteristics 
are held constant. Only in a single case, the effects of ‘feeling European’ on support 
for NATO membership in Russia, 
 
 
Table 5. European self-identity, the market and politics 
 
Belarus Russia Ukraine  
Don’t 
feel 
Feel Total Don’t 
feel 
Feel Total Don’t 
feel 
Feel Total
Support for a 
market 
economy 
57 64 57 43 56 45 45 54 45 
Support for 
democracy 
40 53 43 30 41 32 30 54 34 
 
Source: as Table 1. 
Notes: Question wording was ‘Do you think of yourself as a European?’. Statistically significant 
associations are highlighted on the basis of adjusted residuals as in Table 3. ‘Support for a market 
economy’ was derived from an arithmetic average of three variables (‘state property’ vs. ‘private 
property’, ‘income equality’ vs. ‘income according to merit’ and ‘guaranteed employment and low pay’ 
vs. ‘high pay but a risk of being fired’) and rescaled 
to a new scale from 1 (meaning support for a Soviet type of economy), 2 (neither) to 3 (meaning 
support for a market type of economy). The ‘support for democracy’ question was worded as ‘which of 
the following political systems is most appropriate for [country]?’. Partial or complete support for 
‘democracy of the western type’ was counted as ‘support for democracy’. Figures show rounded 
percentages within columns for each question; estimates exclude ‘don’t knows’ and ‘no answers’, and 
therefore do not sum to 100. 
 
was there no significant relationship; there were also some variations in the 
association between a European self-identity and support for a market economy, with 
a closer relationship in Russia than in the other two countries. 
We were interested not simply in individual attitudes, but in the patterns of support 
across political space. Accordingly, we examined the association between a European 
self-identity and support for the variety of party families that have competed for 
electoral support within the region. As Table 7 suggests, 
 
 
Table 6. Economic and political attitudes by European self-identity controlling for 
socioeconomic characteristics 
 
(Partial regression coefficients) Attitudinal 
variables Belarus Russia Ukraine 
Pro-market 0.044 (0.019)**       0.056 (0.016)***     0.033 (0.017)* 
Pro-Western 
democracy 
0.092 (0.025)***      0.069 (0.021)***     0.188 (0.024)*** 
Pro-EU 0.122 (0.018)***      0.085 (0.019)***    0.172 (0.017)*** 
Pro-NATO 0.077 (0.015)***      0.021 (0.015)          0.115 (0.014)*** 
 
Source: As Table 1, based on our 2004 Belarus and Ukraine and 2005 Russia surveys. 
Notes: * statistically significant at p , 0.10; ** statistically significant at p , 0.05; *** 
statistically significant at p , 0.01, both two-tailed; standard errors are in brackets. 
‘Pro-market’ is scaled from 0 ¼ pro-Soviet economy to 5 ¼ pro-market economy. 
‘Prowestern democracy’ is scored from 1 ¼ pro-Soviet type of political system to 5 ¼ 
prowestern- style democracy. ‘Pro-EU’ and ‘pro-NATO’ are respectively scored from 
1 ¼ least support to 5 ¼ most support for EU/NATO membership. European self-
identity is coded from 1 ¼ ‘don’t think of myself as a European at all’ to 5 ¼ ‘think 
of myself as a European to a significant extent’. Controls are social-economic 
characteristics as defined in Table 3, including ‘region’. 
 
there is at least one clear association: across all three countries, ‘feeling European’ is 
likely to be associated with support for a pro-market party—particularly so in Russia 
and Ukraine, less markedly so (although still statistically significant) in Belarus. 
Unexpectedly, perhaps, there was a much looser negative relationship between 
‘feeling European’ and support for a communist party: only in Ukraine 
were those who thought of themselves as Europeans significantly less likely to 
support a communist party, and vice versa. In all three countries, however, there was 
another clear pattern, in that those who thought of themselves as Europeans were less 
reluctant than others to commit themselves one way or the other. 
Again, was this a genuine or a spurious association? We tested this further by 
regressing each of the variables denoting support for a pro-market party and for a 
communist party on European self-identity while controlling for personal 
characteristics as defined in Table 3, including region. Table 8 presents the logistic 
regression results for all three countries. It shows that when socio-economic 
characteristics are taken into account, a European self-perception is statistically 
significant in predicting support for a pro-market party in Russia and Ukraine, but not 
in Belarus. The negative relationship between a European self-identity and support for 
a communist party was also confirmed, but only in Ukraine was there a statistically 
significant association when socio-economic characteristics were held constant. 
 
Some conclusions 
Self-identified ‘Europeans’, on our evidence, are a small but distinctive minority. 
They are more likely to be male, and aged under 30 years; in Russia and Ukraine they 
are better educated, and in Ukraine they are likely to think of themselves as having a 
higher income. ‘Europeans’ are more likely to live in the western parts of the 
countries in which they are resident; ‘Soviet citizens’ are more numerous in the 
east. Belarusians, on the whole, are more likely to identify themselves as Europeans. 
These were patterns that remained whether we asked respondents if they ‘felt 
European’, or whether they were allowed to opt for a ‘European’ 
 
Table 7. Party preference by European self-identity 
 
Belarus Russia Ukraine  
Don’t 
feel 
Feel Total Don’t 
feel 
Feel Total Don’t 
feel 
Feel Total
Support for a 
pro-market 
party 
13 17 13 21 31 23 16 27 18 
Support for a 
communist 
7 7 7 14 12 14 25 14 23 
party 
None (a) 68 59 68 44 38 43 34 25 33 
 
 
Source: As Table 1, 2004 Belarus and Ukraine surveys and 2005 Russia survey. 
Notes: ‘Don’t feel’ and ‘feel a European’ include all who ‘to some’ or ‘to a significant extent’ 
associated themselves with the question. Cells highlighted in bold show a statistically significant 
association between two variables, judged by the values of adjusted residuals, as in Table 3. 
(a) Includes ‘don’t knows’ and ‘no response’ as well as ‘none’. 
 
Table 8. Party family support by European self-identity, controlling for socio-
economic characteristics (logistic regression results) 
 
Parameter estimates (standard errors)  
Belarus Russia Ukraine 
Support for a pro-
market party 
0.030 (0.053)            0.133 (0.039)***      0.163 (0.043)*** 
Support for a pro-
communist party 
20.014 (0.074)          20.040 (0.051)          20.138 (0.046)*** 
 
Source: As Table 1, based on our 2004 Belarus and Ukraine and 2005 Russia surveys. 
Notes: * statistically significant at p , 0.10;  ** statistically significant at p , 0.05; *** statistically 
significant at p , 0.01, both two-tailed; standard errors are in brackets. The dependent variable in each 
case is scaled as 1 denoting support and 0, other values. European self-identity is coded from 1 ¼ 
‘don’t think of myself as a European at all’ to 5 ¼ ‘think of myself as a European to a significant 
extent’. Controls are socio-economic characteristics as defined in Table 3, including ‘region’.  
 
identity within a wider repertoire; and they remained when we took social and 
economic circumstances, and region, into account. 
We also found that ‘feeling European’ made a difference. Other things being equal, 
‘Europeans’ were more likely to support a market economy and western democracy, 
and EU and NATO membership. Only in a single case, the effects of ‘feeling 
European’ on support for NATO membership in Russia, was there no significant 
relationship; there were also some variations in the association between a 
European self-identity and support for a market economy, with a closer relationship in 
Russia than in the other two countries. We found in addition that a European self-
identity had significant effects in predicting party support, even when social and 
economic circumstances were taken into account. A European selfidentity was 
significant in predicting support for a pro-market party in Russia and Ukraine, but not 
in Belarus; and it was significant in predicting a lack of support for a communist party 
in Ukraine, but not in the other two countries.  
If levels of European self-identity have important consequences, it becomes still more 
important to understand what predicts a European self-identity in the first place. As 
well as the factors considered in this paper, it is likely that the European Union will 
make a direct contribution of its own depending on whether it includes or excludes, 
encouraging or obstructing the flow of people, goods, services and ideas across the 
new border with its immediate neighbourhood without necessarily providing a 
membership perspective. Identities are not ‘givens’, and a European identity in 
particular has little to do with formal boundaries and much more to do with 
interaction with the outside world, 
levels of prosperity and legality, and membership of wider frameworks of 
association.11 In that continuous process of negotiation, a European self-identity has 
distinct effects but can itself be shaped. 
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Appendix 
 
Our surveys were conducted by Russian Research in association with the project on 
‘Inclusion without Membership? Bringing Russia, Ukraine and Belarus closer to 
“Europe”’, directed by Stephen White, Margot Light and Roy Allison and funded by 
the UK Economic and Social Research Council under grant RES-000-23-0146. In 
Russia, fieldwork took place between 21 December 2003 and 16 January 2004 and 
again between 23 March and 20 April 2005. The number of respondents in each case 
was 2000, selected according to the agency’s normal sampling procedures; it was 
representative of the population aged 18 and over, using a multi-stage proportional 
method with a random route method of selecting households. Interviews were 
conducted face to face in respondents’ homes. The sample was then weighted in 
accordance with sex, age and education in each region. In both cases there were 97 
sampling points, and 150 interviewers were employed; the agency’s standard 
procedures were employed to check the completion of questionnaires and the logical 
consistency of the data. 
 In Belarus, our survey was conducted under the auspices of the same agency between 
27 March and 18 April 2004. The number of respondents was 1597, selected 
according to the agency’s normal sampling procedures; it was representative of the 
population aged 18 and over, using a multi-stage proportional representation method 
with a random route method of selecting households. Interviews were conducted face 
to face in respondents’ homes; the response rate was 66%. The sample was then 
weighted in accordance with sex and age in each region, using the 1999 census 
adjusted on the basis of expert estimates as of the start of 2003. There were 288 
sampling points, and 120 interviewers were employed; 10% of the interviews were 
selected randomly for checking.  
In Ukraine, our survey was conducted under the auspices of the same agency between 
23 March and 2 April 2004. The number of respondents was 2000, selected according 
to the agency’s normal sampling procedures; it was representative of the population 
aged 18 and over, using a multi-level, stratified method with a random method of 
selection at the final stage. Interviews were conducted face to face in respondents’ 
homes; the response rate was 67%. The sample was then weighted in accordance with 
sex and age in each region. There were 259 sampling points, and 187 interviewers 
were employed; 10% of the interviews were selected randomly for checking. 
